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 ABSTRACT    
 
This paper attempts to define, construct a policy framework, and analyze interactions with 
monetary policy of macroprudential policy. The available pieces of evidence suggest that the 
effects of the LTV and DTI regulations for financial stability are rather unclear in Korea.  
It also shows that when financial markets exhibit instability in a stable inflationary 
environment, macroprudential policy could run into conflict with monetary policy.  
This paper proposes an appropriate modality of macroprudential policy to minimize the 
potential conflict with monetary policy.  
 
 
 
 
본 연구는 거시건전성 감독의 정의 ž 목적, 통화신용정책과의 보완, 상충 관계 및 효과를 
분석하고 있다. 한국의 경험을 살펴보면 금융안정을 위한 LTV나 DTI의 감독효과는 분명히 
나타나지 않는다.  
더구나 물가가 안정되어 있는 여건에서 금융시장의 불안이 심화되는 경우, 거시건전성  
감독과 통화신용정책은 서로 상충되는 결과를 초래할 수 있다. 이러한 불합리성을 최소화 
하기 위해서는 중앙은행, 감독당국, 그리고 재정정책의 주체 간의 정책조정이 선행되어야 
한다.  
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
A series of financial crises in the 1990s and the 2008-09 global economic crisis 
have brought to light a number of structural frailties of the financial system - both 
domestic and global - that have a bearing on managing financial crisis. They have 
certainly contributed to a better understanding of the causes and consequences of the 
build-up of financial imbalances. It is now widely accepted that contrary to the long 
held view, consumer price stability is not a sufficient condition for financial stability. 
Financial imbalances in the form of the boom and bust in asset markets, excessive 
leverage in financial institutions and households, and deterioration in maturity and 
currency mismatches in the balance sheets of banks and other financial institutions 
could pile up in a non-inflationary environment. The unwinding of these imbalances 
could destabilize the financial system and even trigger a financial crisis, which could 
in turn cause serious disruptions to the economy and interfere with real sector 
development.  
There has also been a sharp increase in the volatility as well as the volume of 
cross-border capital movements with deepening of integration of financial markets 
of individual economies at both the regional and global level. In a globalized 
economy, financial turbulences in one country could easily spill over into 
neighboring economies including even those with strong and sound fundamentals, 
destabilizing their financial systems as well. Finally, experiences with managing 
financial crises in both advanced and emerging economies suggest that the conduct 
of monetary policy could exacerbate rather than prevent the build-up of systemic 
risk unless it is complemented by other policy measures. 
   These changes in the financial landscape have underlined the need to 
strengthen the foundation of the domestic financial system to improve its resilience 
to external shocks and to develop new policy instruments that could complement 
monetary and fiscal policy in safeguarding the economy against financial instability. 
The search for new policy tools has led to a reorientation of macroeconomic 
dimensions of microprudential supervision.  
In the wake of the 1997-90 Asian financial crisis, Crockett (2000) proposed that 
microprudential supervision and regulation, which had been traditionally directed 
to protect depositors and investors, should be reoriented toward maintaining 
financial stability by “marrying the micro and macro-prudential dimensions of 
financial stability.” This was followed by the construction of a macroprudential 
framework for financial supervision and regulation (Borio 2003), which had been 
further refined by a series of papers by the staff of the BIS.  
Since the eruption of the 2008-09 global economic crisis, macroprudential policy 
has taken center stage of the discussion of the assessment of health and safety of the 
financial system and prevention of future financial crises. The IMF program for the 
assessment of systemic financial stability and the growing attention central banks 
and other policy authorities are paying to monitoring, analyzing, and formulating 
policy responses all bear witness to the growing importance of macroprudential 
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supervision as a new macroeconomic policy. 
 Although there has been a growing literature on macroprudential policy in 
recent years, there appears to be a considerable disagreement on its scope and 
effectiveness.1  Indeed, there is neither a widely accepted definition of financial 
stability nor an appropriate operational framework for macroprudential policy. It is 
generally agreed that efficiency of monetary policy would improve, if it is 
complemented by macroprudential supervision: Yet, it is proved to be difficult to 
identify the contour of a new system of coordination of the two polices. This is 
because the new system needs to be designed in a way that will avoid the potential 
conflict in which the effects of the two polices cancel out each other because 
macroprudential policy has macroeconomic spillovers, whereas monetary policy 
affects risk-taking behavior of financial market participants.  
In this paper, an attempt is made to clarify some of the analytical as well as 
operational issues related to the construction of a macroprudential policy framework 
for financial supervision and regulation, in particular interactions between monetary 
and macroprudential policy. To set the stage for the discussion, Section 2 examines 
the operational definition, the rationale behind, and the scope of macroprudential 
policy in the context of emerging economies. This is followed by a discussion of the 
role and effectiveness of macroprudential policy in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes 
Korea’s experience with managing macroprudential policy. Section 5 is devoted to 
outlining an appropriate scope and modality of macroprudential supervision. 
Concluding remarks are in the final section.  
Ⅱ. Role and Scope of Macroprudential Policy 
1. Definition and Rationale  
 
Monetary policy should be an integral component of any policy framework for 
managing financial imbalances. As the monetary authority, the central bank does—
and in fact has to— monitor and assess financial market developments as part of the 
process of adjusting the stance of monetary policy. Depending on the gravity of the 
situation, it may use its policy tools to alleviate financial disruptions threatening 
systemic risk. However, it would not do so unless they imperil price stability for 
which the central bank is primarily responsible. It would also be reluctant to 
intervene largely because it does not have effective instruments to lean against the 
financial cycle or to restrain excessive leverage and risk taking of financial market 
participants. For example, a higher policy rate may be able to stabilize high asset 
prices, but when speculation sets in, it is likely to do so at the cost of a larger output 
gap, if consumer price inflation is below the target rate (Blanchard et al. 2010).  
If monetary policy is not an appropriate instrument—in scope and 
effectiveness—for addressing the buildup of systemic risk, then questions arise as to 
whether the financial regulatory authorities could shoulder much of the 
                                                           
1 See Galati and Moessner (2011) for a literature survey. 
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responsibility for assessing and safeguarding financial stability. Indeed, if individual 
financial institutions are healthy, sound, and efficiently managed, the likelihood of 
financial distress is expected to decline.  
Since the regulatory authorities are entrusted with enforcing prudential 
standards and codes of good behavior at these institutions, they could contain 
contagion of insolvency of a financial institution to fend off a run on the entire 
financial system. Prudential supervision of individual institutions or 
microprudential supervision is therefore a critical component of any tool kit for 
financial stability and strengthening it is no less essential than before: the regulatory 
authorities should assume a large part of the financial stability function. 
While it is an essential component, as long as it is bound by safety of individual 
institutions, microprudential supervision will not be a suitable tool for financial 
stabilization. This focus may result in excessive protection to undermine the safety of 
individual institutions it supervises (Crockett 2000). Furthermore, the soundness of 
individual institutions is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
stability of the financial system as a whole. As Goodhart (2004) points out, 
depending on the nature of the inter-linkages among financial institutions and 
markets, financial systems containing individually weak institutions may 
nevertheless be systemically robust and vice versa (p.9).2  
The emphasis on individual institutions does not also leave much room for 
microprudential supervision to weigh up or deal with an increasing array of 
macroeconomic risk factors common to all financial institutions, such as a high 
degree of volatility of capital flows, the boom-bust cycle in asset markets, and 
sudden changes in market sentiment and expectations. This limitation is likely to 
cause a failure in monitoring the increase in systemic risk and taking appropriate 
remedial actions. 
The above two constraints associated with the institution specific focus have led 
to reorienting and refining macroeconomic dimensions of microprudential 
supervision as a means of managing systemic risk. Macroprudential policy is defined 
as “the use of prudential tools with the explicit objective of promoting the stability of 
the financial system as a whole, not necessarily of the individual institutions within it” 
(Clement 2010). It is intended to prevent the buildup of systemic risk, which could 
destabilize the financial system and, as a consequence, the whole economy.3  
According to a BIS paper (CGFS 2010), systemic risk is “a risk of disruption to 
financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial 
system and has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real 
economy.” Borio (2009) and Hannoun (2010) identify two types of disruption that 
could cause the accumulation of financial imbalances. One type is the financial cycle 
– the procyclicality over the business cycle in lending at banks and other non-bank 
financial institutions. Another is a cross dimensional disruption arising from a direct 
exposure of financial institutions to a set of common shocks or risk factors as in the 
case of holding the same or similar assets or an indirect exposure through the  
                                                           
2 Goodhart cites the Japanese experience in the 1980s as an example in which banks were strong 
individually, but they were systemically weak in the face of the bursting of the real estate bubble. 
3 See Crockett 2000, Borio 2003, and White 2004 on the procyclicality of lending. 
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<Table 1> Micro and Macro Approach  
 Macroprudential Microprudential 
Objective 
Limiting systemic risk of the 
financial system: mitigating the 
failure of a large segment of the 
financial system. 
Limiting idiosyncratic risk of 
individual institutions: 
protection of depositors and 
investors 
Implementation of 
supervisory controls 
Top-down: setting prudential 
control in terms of the 
probability and costs of 
systemic distress 
Bottom-up: setting and 
aggregating prudential control 
in relation to the risk of each 
institution 
Characteristics of risk 
Endogenous: Originating in the 
collective behavior of and 
interactions between 
institutions 
Exogenous: Given to individual 
institutions and the disregard 
of feedback of collective actions 
Common exposure to 
systemic risk 
Relevant and important: causes 
of the fallacy of composition Irrelevant 
Use of instruments 
Standard prudential tools plus 
linking provisioning and 
pricing of risk to the volume of 
loan 
Uniform solvency standards 
and codes of conduct 
Focus of supervision 
 
(i) A greater weight given to 
banks and larger and more 
complex institutions; 
(ii) Market monitoring: and 
(iii)Countercyclical orientation 
Protection of individual 
institutions 
Sources: Crockett (2000) and Borio (2003 and 2009). 
 
 
network linkages as in the case of assuming counterparty risks.4  
To be sure, these objectives are not mutually exclusive, as a greater resilience of 
the financial system would enable the system to adjust to financial cycles better 
(Crockett 2000 and Borio 2002). In contrast, the microprudential objective is to limit 
idiosyncratic risk individual financial institutions are exposed to. The 
macroprudential supervisory standard is derived from a top-down, whereas the 
microprudential standard from a bottom-up approach. The systemic risk the 
macroprudential approach deals with is endogenous as it is determined by the 
collective behavior of individual institutions whereas the idiosyncratic risk is 
exogenous. The differences between the two supervisory approaches are 
summarized in Table 1. 
                                                           
4 To put it differently, macroprudential policy is designed to lean against the wind when systemic risk 
is building up and to stem the risks originating in interconnections and spillovers in the financial system 
(CGFS 2010 and Hanoun 2010). See also Crockett (2000), Borio (2003), and White (2004) on the 
procyclicality of lending. 
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In recent years, the creation of a unified financial supervising system 
independent from the central bank has also brought to the fore the need to define the 
scope, tools, and division of labor in conducting macroprudential policy. If a central 
bank was engaged in some types of macroprudential supervision before the 
supervisory oversight was separated out and transferred to a new independent 
institution, it would certainly use microprudential tools to complement its monetary 
policy, tightening in the up-phase while relaxing them in the down-phase of the 
business cycle. With the creation of an independent supervising authority, then it 
stands to reason that the stability function needs to be shared by both the central 
bank and the supervisory authority and that the central bank has to coordinate its 
conduct of monetary policy with the financial supervisory agencies. 
 
 
2. Tools of Macroprudential Policies  
 
There is a growing literature on macroprudential policy, yet the precise contour 
of the macroprudential supervision in monitoring, analyzing, and participating in 
the designing of policy responses to an impending financial stress is yet to be defined. 
The advocates of macroprudential orientation of financial supervision do not 
necessarily propose either creating new prudential controls or adding new 
functional responsibilities to the supervisory authority, they are arguing for the 
adjustment of the traditional modality of supervision in a way that will contribute to 
mitigating systemic risks.  
For analytical purposes, the tools for macroprudential supervision are divided 
into the two categories of time- and cross-sectoral-dimensions as shown in Table 2. In 
each category, the tools are also divided into those developed for mitigating systemic 
risk and recalibrated microprudential tools. Most of the instruments with a cross-
sectoral dimension in Table 2 are microprudential tools recalibrated for 
macroeconomic objectives of sustaining financial stability.5 They take the form of 
restrictions or incentives related to financial firms' balance sheets designed and 
implemented to contain distress of individual financial institutions. As Hannoun 
(2010) argues, they could be utilized to mitigate systemic risk as they can 
complement the instruments of monetary policy. Some of the instruments such as 
capital and liquidity surcharges on SIFI, restrictions on leverage in particular types of 
lending, and currency mismatches may be used to strengthen resilience of the 
financial system. As in the case of SIFIs, the regulatory authorities may separate out 
vital institutions to reflect their potential threat to the stability of the financial system 
(Borio 2009).  
A host of microprudential tools with a time dimension may also be reoriented to 
help tame the procyclicality of lending by banks and other non-bank financial 
institutions. As shown in Table 2, those developed specifically for lessening systemic 
risk include: countercyclical capital charges, forward-looking provisioning for loan 
losses, and levy on non-core deposits. Recalibrated tools include the loan-to-value 
                                                           
5 CGFS (2010) and Hannoun (2010) provide a list of these instruments categorized by the disruptions 
to the financial system they constrain.  
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<Table 2> Macroprudential Policy Tools 
Source: IMF (2011). 
 
 
ratio, the repayment period, margi
estate lending, and the countercyclical adjustment of exposure to the real estate 
sector to be tightened in the upswing and loosened in the downswing phase 
(Hannoun 2010).6 These tools could be adjusted fre
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 These instruments can be complemented by the dynamic provisioning, but with caution. This is 
because the dynamic provisioning scheme ma
firms and households that have increasingly accounted for a large share of customers at banks. Large firms 
have access to international as well as domestic capital markets for the financing of their i
Denied credit at banks, they could issue commercial paper, bonds, and equities to raise funds they need. 
These financing alternatives are often not available to small
boom, the dynamic provisioning may
likely to be perceived as high-
7 It should be noted that the preceding categorization is based on broad correspondence between the 
instruments and the two objectives of macroprude
LTV ratio, which can improve the resilience of the financial system, but also serve as an automatic 
stabilizer for the financial system (CGFS 2010).
Ⅰ  
 
n requirements, capital requirements against real 
quently and quantitatively
y have an inherent bias against small- and medium
- and medium-sized firms. During an economic 
 discriminate against small- and medium-sized firms, which are 
risk clients. 
ntial policy as some of these instruments such as the 
 
 
.7 
-sized 
nvestment. 
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Ⅲ. Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policy in Leaning against 
Financial Cycle8 
1. Fungibility of Money: Ineffectiveness of Selective Credit Control 
 
In a situation where bubbles are in the making in the markets for real or financial 
assets, the financial supervisory authority may consider invoking macroprudential 
regulations to reduce mortgage lending at banks and other non-bank financial 
intermediaries by using two types of instruments. The first includes some of the 
recalibrated microprudential tools such as the LTV (Loan to Value) and DTI (Debt to 
Income) ratios, which are adjusted to control the supply of mortgage loans. If these 
two instruments proved to be inadequate, the supervisory authority may strengthen 
its control by employing the second type reserved for tempering procyclicality in 
bank lending such as countercyclical capital charges, dynamic loan-loss provisioning, 
and capital conservation rules for banks. Implementation of these two types of 
instruments entails quantitative – rather than price – control of the availability of 
sectoral as well as aggregate bank credit. This section argues that because of 
fungibility of money and potential conflict with monetary policy these tools lose 
much of their effectiveness in suppressing the bubbles.  
In order to elaborate on this argument, suppose that the regulatory authority 
lowers the ceilings of the two ratios – LTV and DTI – to stave off a housing market 
boom, and that there is no change in the stance of monetary policy. The squeeze on 
mortgage lending is likely to discourage borrowing for consumption demand – the 
purchases of houses for their services – but not necessary for the investment demand 
by those investors seeking higher capital gains if housing prices are expected to rise 
continuously.  
Under these circumstances, as long as the level of total bank lending is left 
unchanged, banks will be able to extend more of other types of business and 
consumer loans with the funds released form housing finance they curtail. But, if the 
expected real return on housing investment is perceived to be higher than the 
returns on other assets, many of the borrowers taking out other non-mortgage bank 
loans are likely to invest the bulk of their loan proceeds in housing.9 This results 
from the fungibility of money and imperfections in ex post loan use monitoring that 
may result in the diversion of non-mortgage loans. 
Given the fungibility of money, it appears that in countries where housing has 
become good substitutes for financial assets and banks dominate financial 
intermediation, restrictions on mortgage lending alone may not be effective in 
preventing the housing market bubble. To be effective, they may need to be 
complemented by an overall cut back in aggregate bank credit through, for instance,
                                                           
8 This section draws on Park (2010). 
9 A housing market boom often coincides with land speculation. Business borrowers may decide to 
use a fixed investment loan to build a plant on a larger site of land than otherwise. 
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an increase in loan-loss provisioning to curtail further the availability of housing 
finance.  
However, the overall cutback is likely to create two types of spillover problems. 
One problem is that once housing speculation gathers forces, as shown by the 
Korean experience discussed in Section 4, even the simultaneous squeeze on both the 
sectoral and aggregate supply of bank credit may not be enough to keep housing 
speculators at bay. This is because despite the overall tightening of bank credit, some 
of the loans extended to non-housing borrowers could be drawn away to be invested 
in housing as long as real property speculation picks up speed. Another problem is 
that as discussed below, a tighter macroprudential policy runs into conflict with the 
conduct of monetary policy, which remains neutral, as it exerts contractionary effects 
on aggregate demand for goods and services. 
 
 
2. Macroprudential and Monetary Policy: Are they Independent? 
 
A growing number of countries—both advanced and emerging—have taken to 
using macroprudential tools in their efforts to stabilize their financial systems, but 
because of its short history, not much is known about its effectiveness in controlling 
systemic risk over and at a point in time, and in a cross sectional dimension in 
emerging economies. 
 Experiences of these countries suggest that faced with growing systemic risk, 
both monetary and supervisory authorities work well in unison to forestall a 
financial crisis when both consumer and asset prices are rising or falling together. In 
this case, the stance of the two polices would be the same and there are no spillover 
problems. When the build-up of inflationary pressure is accompanied by asset price 
bubbles, both policies will be tightened—for example, the policy rate is raised while 
the loan-loss provisioning will be increased–and they will reinforce each other. 
However, when the two prices move in the opposite directions, a serious problem of 
working at cross-purposes arises.  
Citing the literature on the target-tool assignment, Yellen (2010) argues, “it is 
perfectly possible to attain good outcomes even if monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy are carried out separately and independently, and the goals 
of each are pursued using entirely separate tool kits.” Yellen claims that satisfactory 
results can be attained without policy coordination, even though fully optimal policy 
generally calls for coordination when spillovers occur, because situations may arise 
in which the central bank, in its conduct of monetary policy, might not be able to 
fully offset the macroeconomic effects of macroprudential interventions.10 In this 
                                                           
10 Yellen (2010) points out that higher supervisory standards for capital following the real estate-
related loan losses of the early 1990s may have slowed the economy's recovery from the recession. More 
stringent bank capital and liquidity requirements to stem systemic risk—when many economies suffer 
from high unemployment—they may delay economic recovery unless implemented in gradual manner 
over time. The new Basel III agreement recognizes the desirability of a phase in period for these standards. 
The implementation of tighter standards over a multi-year period could mitigate the concern that the 
macroprudential policies designed to control systemic risk will unduly restrict the availability of credit. 
A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Supervision and Monetary Policy in Emerging Economics    11 
 
 
 
section, it is argued that largely because many of the tools of macroprudential policy 
work through the channels of monetary policy, the independence of 
macroprudential policy as a macroeconomic policy instrument is not warranted. 
To examine further this lack of independence, consider again a situation in which 
consumer prices are not expected to rise beyond a target range, but a surge in 
housing prices threatens a bubble. Under these circumstances, the central bank could 
increase the policy rate to suppress unwarranted high expectations of capital gains, 
but would be reluctant to do so, unless the speculation has the danger of increasing 
inflationary pressure, whereas the regulatory authority would be called into action.11 
Suppose they lower the capping of the LTV and DTI together causing a squeeze on 
overall bank credit supply.  
This tighter macroprudential policy is likely to move banks to raise interest rates 
on their loans. It will also drive many of their loan customers out of the bank loan 
market and into money and capital markets for direct financing. This increase in the 
debt and equity financing will then increase market interest rates. If this happens, 
higher interest rates may dampen the aggregate demand for goods and services 
(with a possible exception of construction investment) as many borrowers without 
access to the capital market will be rationed out of the bank loan market, while it has 
limited effects on suppressing housing market speculation. The tighter stance of 
macroprudential policy may therefore widen the output gap depending on the 
extent to which bank loans are shifted to housing finance. Macroprudential measures 
may strengthen the financial system but do not necessarily help enhance financial 
stability. It follows then, that if the policy rate is a poor tool to deal with financial 
market instability, so are macroprudential tools for moderating financial cycles. 
The preceding discussion raises an important question as to whether the division 
of labor in policy management in which the central bank follows an interest rate rule 
in conducting monetary policy for price stability, whereas the regulatory authorities 
are engaged in quantitative control in managing macroprudential policy for financial 
stability is a viable institutional arrangement.  
This question arises because most of the macroprudential instruments leaning 
against financial cycles work through changes in the availability of sectoral and 
aggregate credit and in this respect, they are similar to reserve requirements. That is, 
macroprudential tools operate through effects on bank lending: changes in bank 
loans cause investment and consumer spending to change. Since this bank-lending 
channel is one of many channels of monetary policy, it follows that in emerging 
economies where the banking system dominates financial intermediation. As far as 
the channel of transmission is concerned, macroprudential policy geared to 
controlling procyclicality in bank lending and monetary policy targeted for price 
stability are one and the same, although they have different objectives. 
 
 
                                                           
11  The fiscal authorities may raise the property tax rate and impose additional taxes on the 
transactions in and transfer of properties, but these types of taxation may not be desirable as they distort 
property markets to impair their efficiency. 
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Ⅳ. Korea’s Experience with Macroprudential Policy: 2001-2011 
During the 1997-98 financial crisis when interest rates were skyrocketing and 
bank lending evaporated, real properties markets had taken a severe beating with a 
collapse of their prices. However, it did not take long for these markets to thrive 
again. Beginning in 2002, Korea was gripped again with a haunting memory for the 
boom-bust cycles in real estate prices—that had plagued the economy periodically 
throughout the pre-crisis period–with a steep rise in prices of housing.12 One of the 
main causes of this resurgence was the speedy recovery of the economy with a 
return of stability in the financial system, but easy monetary policy with bank 
lending deregulation was largely responsible for inflaming the housing market boom.  
Korea suffered from the global IT bubble burst in 2001 with a dip in the growth 
rate. This set back in growth had led the Bank of Korea to cut the policy rate to 4 
percent on September 2001 from a high of 5.25 a year earlier and kept it between 4.25 
percent and 3.25 percent during the 2002 and 2005. The expansionary monetary 
policy then combined with the deregulation of mortgage lending at banks and non-
bank financial institutions in the wake of the 1997-98 to rekindle real asset 
speculation.  
For more than a decade thereafter, Korea’s fiscal and financial regulatory 
authorities have battled for brining real asset speculation under control by 
implementing various financial regulatory and tax policy measures. In contrast, 
however, the Bank of Korea has largely remained detached from the housing market 
boom by keeping an easy stance of monetary policy. As a result, the financial 
regulatory authority took the brunt of the responsibility of stabilizing real estate 
markets.13 The Financial Supervisory Service (FSS)—the watchdog of financial 
institutions and markets—has employed macroprudential tools to smooth out  
                                                           
12 Ro (2007) shows that the investment demand with its potential for capital gains dominated the 
consumption demand for housing in the Seoul metropolitan area by comparing the sales price index with 
its rental price index from 1999 to 2007 period. The rental-to-sales price ratio, which measures the degree of 
the weight of the consumption demand in the market value of a house or apartment unit, declined after 
October 2001 when the sales price sharply climbed up. 
13 The financial supervisory authority consists of the two organizations: the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC) and Financial Supervisory Commission (FSS). The Financial Services Commission 
serves as a consolidated policy making body for the supervision of the financial industry as a whole. The 
Financial Supervisory Service was established on January 2, 1999, under the Act on the Establishment of 
Financial Supervisory Organizations by bringing together four supervisory bodies—Banking Supervisory 
Authority, Securities Supervisory Board, Insurance Supervisory Board, and Non-bank Supervisory 
Authority—into a single supervisory organization. The primary function of the FSS is examination and 
supervision of financial institutions but, it also conducts other oversight and enforcement functions as 
requested by the Financial Services Commission and the Securities and Futures Commission. The posts of 
the FSC Chairman and the FSS Governor were separated on March 2008 for clear distinction between 
policy-making and execution of financial market supervision. 
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[Figure 1] Changes in the Real House Price index (HPI/CPI) and the Policy rate 
Note: HPI: Index for Seoul apartment prices
CPI: Consumer Price Index 
Source: Bank of Korea and Kookmin Bank.
 
 
fluctuations in the prices of residential and commercial housing and land by 
controlling procyclicality in mortgage lending. Although the available evidence is 
rather sketchy, it appears that these regulatory measures have not inspired much 
confidence in controlling real asset 
As shown in Figure 1, over a six
house price index—the 
doubled.15 The housing boom ended early in 2007 to be followed by a persistent 
slump. Understandably, throughout the period, the FSS has directed mu
effort to remedying susceptibility to speculation and improving resilience of the 
housing market. To this end, it has selected to impose
on twelve occasions.16  
Concerned about an incipient housing boom threatening an 
prices, the FSS introduced the LTV capping with a ceiling of 60 percent in 2002 to 
                                                          
14 A 2010 survey by the BIS on 
most cases the objective was to enhance the resilience of the financial system rather than moderating 
financial cycles and that the evidence on the effectiveness of macroprudential measur
(CGFS 2010). 
15 The house price index used is based on prices of apartment units in the Seoul metropolitan area
16 For the details of changes in the mortgage lending regulations, see Igan and Kang (2011) and Chang 
(2010). 
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curb mortgage lending. Since then it has adjusted the ratio eight times. On six 
occasions, the FSS has tightened it to squelch a housing market boom and loosened 
in 2004 and 2009 to stimulate housing demand. On August 2005, the regulatory 
authority fortified its arsenal of macroprudential tools by including the DTI 
regulation, which since then has been tightened five times and loosened up twice. 
The boom in real asset markets, in particular housing, has been concentrated in 
many districts of the Seoul metropolitan area, while keeping most other regions 
uninfected. As a result, the FSS has concentrated on the Seoul metropolitan area as 
the target for its macroprudential policy. As shown in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix, 
the FSS first lowered the LTV cap to 50 percent on June 2003 for mortgage loans with 
maturity less than 3 years extended by banks and insurance firms in the Seoul 
metropolitan districts infected by speculation. The LTV control turned out to be less 
than effective, because of the leakages: banks were able and in fact started lending 
for housing finance with maturity longer than 3 years to avoid the restriction while 
non-bank financial institutions were not subject to it. Six months later on October, to 
plug these leakages, the FSS extended and tightened the LTV regulation to cover 
mortgage loans with 10 years or less maturity by lowering the LTV cap to 40 percent 
for apartment purchases.17  
After the LTV tightening, the rise of housing prices had begun decelerating, but it 
was not clear whether it was the right time to relax macroprudential policy. Unsure 
about whether the market lull could last, the FSS took a cautious step of relaxation by 
lifting up the LTV ratio to 70 percent for mortgage loans with maturity longer than 
10 years on March 2004. However, within less than a year, housing prices reversed 
their downward trend to soar again. This resurgence prompted the FSS to cut the 
LTV cap on those mortgage loans with maturity longer than 10 years for the 
purchase of an apartment valued at more than 600 million won (or approximately 
600 thousand US dollars) in the speculative zones on June 2005. On November 2006, 
this restriction became more extensive to include nonbank financial institutions at a 
higher ceiling of 50 percent to slowdown their mortgage lending. 
After the Lehman Brothers’ collapse, which triggered a liquidity crisis, a deeper 
recession, and contraction of housing demand, Korea’s policy makers also realized 
the need to relieve household borrowers of the burden of servicing their mortgage 
debt. This debt relief led the FSS to removing most of the speculative areas from its 
list of control on November 2008. With the recovery from the liquidity crisis gaining 
speed in the early months of 2009, however, banks were increasing their mortgage 
lending and housing prices started rising again. In response, the FSS lowered the 
LTV ratio to 50 percent for loans at banks for financing apartment worth more than 
600 million won in the metropolitan area on July 2009. Three months later, this 
regulation applied to all financial institutions.   
To complement the LTV regulation, between August 2005 and August 2007, the 
FSS lowered the DTI ratios five times at banks and other non-bank financial 
institutions. At its inception in 2005, a relatively small segment of riskier borrowers 
                                                           
17 In Korea, there is a liquid market for apartments, which are standardized in terms of size and 
actively traded. In particular, smaller ones are easily marketable, making them tradable investment assets 
and good substitutes for financial assets. 
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buying apartments–those who were single and under the age of 30 or if married, 
those whose spouses had debt—was subject to the ceiling of 40 percent in several 
districts of the Seoul metropolitan area prone to speculation. Less than a year later, 
on March 26, the coverage of the restriction was broadened to include the 
borrowings for the purchases of smaller apartment units priced at 600 million won 
and more. A year later, apartment units worth 600 million won or less were also 
subjected to this regulation with the ratios set between 40 to 60 percent  
As in the case of the LTV, the FSS removed most areas off its list of speculative 
zones on November 2008. The relaxation did not last long, however. On September 
2009, the FSS saw the need to tighten the DTI regulation, only to loosen up again less 
than a year later when the housing market showed signs of contraction.  
Observing the raw data on housing price developments since 2001, one may 
conclude that macroprudential policy of adjusting the LTV and DTI tools has been 
effective in taming the real estate market boom, but failed to prevent its stagnation. 
This is also the conclusion reached by Igan and Kang (2011). For a study on the 
effectiveness of macroprudential measures, the authors estimate an equation where a 
number of housing market variables are regressed against a vector of control 
variables and a dummy, which takes on the value of 1 in the six months following 
the implementation of the LTV and DTI changes.  
The results of this estimation show that the rates of increase in housing prices 
dropped significantly for the six months following the tightening of the LTV. This 
deceleration is largely driven by developments in the metropolitan areas, most of 
which were designated as the speculative zones. Surprisingly, however, the results 
of the DTI tightening—which is known to be a more powerful tool—are not as 
robust as those of the LTV.  
The authors also find that the rate of increase in the number of housing 
transactions fall significantly during the six months after the LTV and DTI ratios are 
lowered mostly in the metropolitan areas. They do not find, however, any 
effectiveness of these macroprudential tools on reviving the sagging demand or 
negative association between the growth of household borrowing and tightening of 
the two ratios.  
In their study, Igan and Kang do not examine the effectiveness of changes in the 
two macroprudential tools six months after the policy implementation is announced. 
Another recent study by Kang (2011) finds that it tends to disappear. The estimation 
results of Igan and Kang are less convincing than otherwise as they do not discuss 
some of the structural characteristics of Korea’s housing market and limitations of 
the LTV regulation that could affect their results.  One problem with the empirical 
examinations such as the one conducted by Egan and Kang is the difficulty of 
isolating the effects of the LTV regulation when it is implemented with other policies 
such as monetary policy, tax, and other administrative measures. Kim et al. (2010), 
for instance, lists 29 housing polices introduced during the Roh Moo Hyun 
Administration (2003-07), which ranged from housing acquisition and registration 
tax to new town construction. Obviously all these variables cannot be controlled 
properly in a simple regression analysis.  
 On a closer inspection, it is clear that despite the implementation of these 
macroprudential measures, housing speculation did not subside until January 2007. 
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During the 2005-07 period, it became clear that stronger doses of anti-speculation 
measures were needed and the stronger measures implemented included direct 
controls on housing transactions such as the requirement for registration of and 
imposition of transfer and transaction taxes on trading in properties. In retrospect, it 
is questionable whether the real estate speculation could have been brought under 
control, if the government had refrained from resorting to the tax and other direct 
control measures18.  
The LTV and DTI regulations for mortgage lending are managed in a highly 
complex system of supervision where different ratios are applied to different 
financial institutions and speculative areas.19 This complicated system has left a 
large room for loan leakages and loopholes for evasion. As noted earlier, housing 
speculators could easily divert their non-mortgage loan proceeds or cash in their 
holdings of other assets to finance their housing investments. They could choose to 
move to other areas that are not subject to the mortgage loan regulations to buy 
individual houses or apartments as long as they believe the prices of these real 
properties would continue to go up.  
When housing prices are rising and expected to rise continuously, the tightening 
of the LTV regulation has a limited effect on moderating the growth of mortgage 
loans as banks and other non-bank financial institutions would lend more as the 
value of the housing collateral offered for mortgage loans also increases.  
Korea’s experience also suggests that the supervisory authority has consistently 
been reactive rather than preemptive in managing macroprudential policy—
lowering or raising the ceilings of the LTV and DTI every time it sees noticeable 
changes in housing prices since 2002. This reactive response may help subdue the 
procyclicality in mortgage lending, which was shown to expand six months after the 
surge in housing prices, but it has allowed market participants to forecast with a fair 
degree of accuracy when and how the FSS would respond to changes in housing 
market developments.20  
Knowing from the past episodes that the boom could be persistent once it starts, 
market participants would rush to borrow as much as they could to beat the 
regulatory restrictions that may become more stringent as time passes in a boom 
period. In fact, they would take the restrictions as a signal for a housing market 
boom on the horizon that is likely to last for some time to come once realized. In the 
opposite case where the housing market is down with falling prices, they would stop 
borrowing. In fact, they would leave the market even before the regulatory authority 
reversed its macroprudential policy when they believe that the boom has reached a 
peak. This pattern of behavior on the part of the market participants may have 
increased the volatility of housing prices and frustrate the regulators in their efforts 
to anchor expectations on future housing prices. 
In general, the effectiveness of macroprudential tools may vary depending on the 
                                                           
18 The control variables introduced in Egan and Kang’s study do not include tax regulations, an 
administrative control. 
19 It was unnecessary to impose the lending regulations nationwide because speculation did not 
permeate all housing markets that were disparate and regionally segmented. 
20 On this lag, see Kang (2011). 
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circumstances in which they are implemented. In the preceding section, it is argued 
that the conflict between monetary and macroprudential policies is likely to be more 
severe if rising consumer prices are accompanied by stagnation in the housing 
market as shown by the recent experience in Korea, in which monetary and 
macroprudential policies took divergent paths. 
In August 2010, the central bank raised the policy rate to be on guard against the 
signs of growing inflationary pressure, while the FSS went on to lift up the DTI ratio 
on specific mortgage loans to revive the weak demand for housing. The relaxation 
did little in the way of eliciting any positive housing market response, but the 
regulatory service could not tighten it any further because of a massive increase in 
household indebtedness, which has emerged as an element of systemic risk.21 As 
shown in Figure 2, after three years of slow growth, the availability of household 
loans, the bulk of which consists of mortgage loans, has been rising since 2009, 
whereas housing prices recovered only slightly in 2011 after four consecutive years 
of slowdown against the background of rising consumer prices. This divergence has 
made it difficult to determine an appropriate combination of monetary and 
macroprudential policy (See Figure 3).  
In the meantime, household debt grew rapidly, rising to more than 155 percent of 
disposable income at the end of 2010 from 125 percent six years earlier. Between 2008 
 
[Figure 2] Changes in Housing Loans and Prices  
 
Note: Changes in household loans (billion Korean Won), 
Changes in house price (Seoul apartment prices) index (year on year %) 
Source: The Bank of Korea and Kookmin Bank. 
                                                           
21 During the first seven months of 2010, consumer prices rose by about one percent, whereas housing 
prices in some parts of the Seoul metropolitan area began to fall beginning in the second quarter of 2010. 
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[Figure 3] Changes in CPI and Housing Prices
Note: HPI is an Apartment Price Index
Source: Bank of Korea (ECOS) and Kookmin Bank. 
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and 2010, mortgage loans accounted for 93 percent of the increase in household debt. 
More than 90 percent of these loans carried variable rates and 78.4 percent of 
mortgage loans outstanding were overdue, current only in interest payments. Figure 
4 shows that the bulk of mortgage loans at banks have been financed by short-term 
deposits and borrowing from wholesale funding markets, creating a balance sheet 
maturity mismatch. Given this profile of systemic risk, it was clear that the 
regulatory authority could not relax mortgage loan restrictions, whereas the 
monetary authority had to maintain a tighter stance of monetary policy to keep the 
lid on inflationary expectations. 
Macoprudential tools such as the LTV and DTI are rather inflexible instruments 
that cannot be fine-tuned frequently to alter price expectations in real property 
markets. Fungibility of money makes their effectiveness at best ambiguous. 
Macroprudential policy for controlling the quantity of aggregate credit needs to be 
coordinated with the conduct of monetary policy, but given the different objectives 
and approaches coordination between the monetary and regulatory authorities 
would be difficult to institutionalize.22  
For effective management of macroprudential policy, the regulatory authority, 
FSC and FSS, should be able to detect signs of real asset speculation well before they 
get out of control and to identify the turning points in cyclical developments. 
Equipping the FSS, for example, with macroeconomic forecasting would mean 
duplication of some of the functions of the central bank. This possibility, which could 
result in competing macroeconomic forecasts, underscores further the need to 
construct a mechanism of coordination between the two institutions, which the 
following section turns to. 
Ⅴ. Making Operational a Macroprudential Framework for 
Financial Supervision 
1. Macroprudential Framework  
 
In addressing systemic risk, the financial supervisory authority, FSC and FSS, is 
responsible for providing information on the health and efficiency of financial 
institutions and developments in financial markets pertinent to the assessment of 
financial stability, including the monitoring of various financial indicators, 
interpretation of scenario analyses, and stress testing for both individual financial 
institutions and banking and other financial industries. While this responsibility of 
supplying information and data is of crucial importance, the major task of the 
supervisory authority is to construct and manage a macroprudential policy regime. 
Like in any other policy, this regime is structured around the goal, intermediate 
targets, and tools of financial supervision. 
                                                           
22 The regulatory authorities may have not developed the expertise or culture of macroprudential 
policy, while the central bank cannot exercise supervisory control at the level of individual institutions. 
These institutional constraints could hamper coordination between the two policy authorities.  
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· The Objectives and Modality 
Broadly speaking, the goal of the macroprudential approach to financial 
supervision is to sustain overall stability of the financial system in cooperation with 
other policy authorities. Given this objective, on the part of financial regulators, it 
would be instructive to identify some of the most likely sources from which financial 
distress originates. In emerging economies, as noted earlier, one of the most 
prevalent sources is speculation in asset markets, in particular in those markets for 
land, housing, and commercial real estate, which often leads to the boom-bust cycle 
of their prices.23  
Other sources are likely to be speculative capital outflows and inflows, an 
unsustainable current account deficit, and a high degree of volatility in the foreign 
exchange rate. Of these potential sources of financial instability, it appears that the 
supervisory authority has comparative advantage in controlling speculation in and 
stabilizing prices of real and financial assets as it has detailed information on and 
influence over the asset-liability management of banks and other financial 
institutions.  
In stabilizing financial markets, the financial supervisors will find it necessary to 
analyze and monitor a large number of financial stability indicators such as those 
identified by the global financial stability report by the IMF. In many cases, this 
stability or macroprudential analysis is not backed by quantitative analyses using a 
coherent general equilibrium model that defines and quantifies financial fragility. As 
such, they are descriptive but lack the diagnosis and forecasting of financial stability: 
they are unable to indicate whether financial distress is in the making ex ante and 
explain the consequences of interactions of financial variables, which are mostly 
endogenous.  
The macroprudential analysis needs to be supported by general equilibrium 
models of systemic stability that can analyze and quantify aggregate financial 
stability Goodhart (2004).24 Despite its potential, the reliability and usefulness of the 
general equilibrium approach are not proven in emerging economies. Other less 
sophisticated and partial equilibrium approaches to defining and measuring 
financial distress may be more useful to the emerging economies.  For example, 
Borio and Lowe (2004) propose a scheme in which the probability of financial 
distress is evaluated in terms of a small set of variables that include the ratio of 
private credit to GDP, real asset prices, and investment. They show that over a three-
year horizon, close to 60 percent of the crises are predicted in a sample of 34 
industrial and emerging economies over the 1960-1999 period during which there 
                                                           
23 In the run-up to a financial crisis or during the upswing phase of the business cycle, financial 
imbalances are often manifested in sharp increases in the prices of real and financial assets, regardless of 
whether the causes of the imbalances are of domestic or foreign origin. 
24 Goodhart (2004 and 2006) shows that a general equilibrium model based on a microeconomic 
foundation can be constructed to measure and predict fragility of the banking sector, not the overall 
financial system. This model includes incomplete financial markets, heterogeneous banks, heterogeneous 
bank customers, endogenous default, and credit and deposit markets. An index of financial distress of the 
banking sector is defined in terms of the probability of default of the banking sector, which is chiefly 
related to bank profitability and the bank repayment rate.  
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were 38 crises. In a subsequent paper (2004), they find a similar pattern in emerging 
economies when an over-valued exchange rate is included as an additional 
variable.25 
 
· Intermediate Targets 
Like the central bank’s strategy of using operational and intermediate targets, the 
finance supervisory authority engaged in the macroprudential policy needs to 
choose and aim at a set of variables that lie between its tools and the goal of 
stabilizing financial markets. The strategy to work with the intermediate target is 
desirable for two reasons. One is the difficulty of assessing and forecasting 
impending financial market instability. The difficulty is often compounded by the 
fact that the regulatory authority is not likely to be confident about its ability to 
influence the goal directly. Another reason is that whatever operational mechanism 
instituted for macroprudential policy, it is not likely to be managed on a day-to-day 
basis, but to be activated only when threats to financial stability become visible. By 
then it may be too late to deflect the threats. By installing a system of monitoring and 
analyzing a set of intermediate targets, which may also serve as early warning 
indicators, the financial supervisory institutions may have a better chance of 
detecting the signs of impending financial distress early on. 
The criteria for choosing the intermediate targets are rather straightforward: they 
should be measurable, they should have predictable effects on financial stability, and 
the supervisory authority should command a certain degree of control over the 
variables. Which variables would then qualify as intermediate targets? It is neither 
possible nor practical to consider all those indicators identified by the IMF’s global 
financial stability report. A more realistic strategy would choose a manageable 
number of indicators that send clear signals of an impending asset market boom. In 
this regard, experiences with past financial crises would be helpful in identifying 
promising candidates. They are likely to vary from country to country, but some of 
the potential variables include the volume of lending, sectoral allocation of loans, 
risk spreads, and capital provisions at banks and other financial institutions. 
 
· Management of Macroprudential Supervision 
In conducting macroprudential policy, it would be instructive to think of it as a 
two-stage process of policy implementation. The first stage concentrates on an 
assessment of asset market stability. If potential threats to asset market stability are 
detected, financial regulators may respond to the growing imbalances by tightening 
microprudential tools at their disposal.26 At this first stage, the macroprudential 
response would be tailored to treat all financial institutions the same, as if there were 
“n” number of identical financial institutions. 
At the second stage of the policy response, microprudential policy would 
                                                           
25 The performance of the three variables is measured in terms of the noise-to-signal ratio. In order to 
capture the buildup of financial distress, the authors use the deviations of the three variables from the 
levels of the time of assessment. 
26 The central bank will also be alerted to the disruption and called into action. On its part, the bank 
may raise its policy rate to discourage speculation and transaction. 
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dominate, which consists of (i) monitoring the extent to which financial institutions 
adjust their asset and liability management in response to the tightening of 
prudential controls, and (ii) enforcing these controls if they do not adapt to the 
change. 
In executing prudential controls, microprudential policy should take into 
consideration different financial institutions including banks that behave in different 
ways and are heterogeneous. This means that the exposure level of risk financial 
institutions is likely to be different and idiosyncratic from institution to institution. 
Therefore, financial regulatory institutions may have to exercise considerable 
discretion in differentiating between financial institutions on the basis of their 
relative importance. 
For example, macroprudential operations have to weigh up the knock-on effect of 
financial distress (Crockett 2000 and White 2004). Banks as the suppliers of liquidity 
to the system and large and more complex institutions, such as those engaged in 
universal banking, should be subject to scrutiny in monitoring their imprudent 
behavior than smaller financial firms whose failure may not necessarily pose serious 
systemic risks.  
On implementing prudential tools, questions have been raised as to the extent to 
which the supervisory authorities should be allowed to exercise discretion as 
opposed to relying on a set of rules. In view of the fact that the supervisory authority 
will have difficulty in diagnosing the health and soundness of the financial system 
independently or in cooperation with other authorities, and the effect of the 
macroprudential supervision on the behavior of financial institutions and markets is 
uncertain, relying on discretion could be counter-productive. There is also the 
danger that the supervisory authority loses its credibility and influence on financial 
market participants if they cry wolf too often.27 
 
 
2. Need for Tripartite Policy Coordination 
 
An effective policy response to macroprudential concerns of mitigating financial 
systemic imbalances with their attendant heavy costs in terms of output and 
employment may require a broader framework for macroeconomic policy, which 
encompasses not only the use of macroprudential instruments but also monetary 
and fiscal policy. Only such a broad policy regime can provide critical information 
needed for financial stability about the distribution of risks and various systemic 
vulnerabilities stemming from the transfer of one type of risk to another through the 
interplay among market participants (White 2004). The framework may also have 
                                                           
27 Given these circumstances and risks together with the expediency of the rules, one can make a 
strong case for a rule-based, rather than a discretionary, macroprudential supervision. Goodhart (2004) is 
an advocate of linking not only provisioning but also the pricing of risks to the volume of the lending at 
banks. Borio (2002), however, argues that the rule-based supervision has its share of problems: it may not 
encourage financial institutions to improve their risk management, thereby exacerbating incentives to 
arbitrage it away, and it may not be consistent with promoting a better balance between market and 
policy-induced discipline 
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advantages as it could facilitate policy coordination and institutionalize an integrated 
role of the central bank, the supervisory agency and the fiscal authority.  
In this broader framework, all policy authorities – the central bank, the 
supervisory institution, and the central government fiscal authority with a clear 
division of labor – are jointly responsible for steering the economy clear of financial 
disruptions. Before the supervisory function was separated out, the central banks 
were engaged in some type of macroprudential supervision. Now that many central 
banks do not have the authority of supervising individual financial institutions, the 
responsibilities for financial stability have to be shared among the three institutions 
in terms of policy tools at their disposal. In this regard, it may be desirable to create a 
tripartite committee consisting of all three policy authorities for monitoring and 
analyzing various financial stability indicators and making decisions on the 
activation of policy response to an impending financial crisis. 
Ⅵ. Concluding Remarks 
Macroprudential orientation of financial supervision and regulation is not 
necessarily a new idea. Most central banks with supervisory oversight have been and 
will continue to be engaged in some type of macroprudential supervision. In their 
supervisory role, they would rely on many of the microprudential tools as a means 
of controlling pro-cyclicality in lending and risk management at banks and other 
financial institutions.  
Two relatively recent developments have garnered growing attention to 
macroprudential orientation of financial supervision both in domestic and 
international policy communities.  One has been the realization that the best 
defense against financial instability begins with strengthening the foundations of the 
domestic financial system.  
The other has been the creation of an independent supervisory institution in a 
number of countries. These supervisory institutions are still bound by tradition of 
giving priority to ensuring safety of individual financial institutions to protect 
consumers-depositors and other financial investors. At the same time, many central 
banks have chosen inflation targeting as the framework for their conduct of 
monetary policy. To be sure, central banks should have the mandate to maintain 
overall financial stability, as well. Nevertheless, the transfer of supervisory oversight 
and the focus of the central bank on inflation targeting appear to have created a 
vacuum of macroprudential supervision as a constituent part of an overall 
macroeconomic policy framework for financial stability. This is a highly undesirable 
and unsustainable state of policy management and will have to be rectified. This 
paper recommends the construction of an overall framework for macroprudential 
policy to be managed jointly by monetary, fiscal, and supervisory authorities. 
As a newly established institution, the independent supervisory agency may not 
have had the time to develop either the culture or the expertise needed to 
incorporate macroprudential controls in its supervisory operations. This internal 
constraint has been compounded by the additional burden of conducting 
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macroprudential controls in the absence of a reliable macroeconomic framework for 
macroprudential policy that the authority can make use of in evaluating emergence 
of financial distress and charting appropriate policy responses. Despite the growing 
literature, the ongoing debate, it appears, has not settled on the scope and 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy. What is, therefore, needed at this stage of 
the debate is further research on the quantification and better assessment of systemic 
financial risk and the scope and effectiveness of prudential controls at the 
supervisory agencies. 
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